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Abstract
Background: In spite of a detailed and nation-wide legislation frame, there exist large cantonal disparities in
consumed quantities of health care services in Switzerland. In this study, the most important factors of influence
causing these regional disparities are determined. The findings can also be productive for discussing the
containment of health care consumption in other countries.
Methods: Based on the literature, relevant factors that cause geographic disparities of quantities and costs in
western health care systems are identified. Using a selected set of these factors, individual panel econometric
models are calculated to explain the variation of the utilization in each of the six largest health care service groups
(general practitioners, specialist doctors, hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, medication, and nursing homes) in
Swiss mandatory health insurance (MHI). The main data source is ‘Datenpool santésuisse’, a database of Swiss
health insurers.
Results: For all six health care service groups, significant factors influencing the utilization frequency over time and
across cantons are found. A greater supply of service providers tends to have strong interrelations with per capita
consumption of MHI services. On the demand side, older populations and higher population densities represent
the clearest driving factors.
Conclusions: Strategies to contain consumption and costs in health care should include several elements. In the
federalist Swiss system, the structure of regional health care supply seems to generate significant effects. However,
the extent of driving factors on the demand side (e.g., social deprivation) or financing instruments (e.g., high
deductibles) should also be considered.
Background
Switzerland is a small, western European country with a
population in 2009 of 7.8 million persons who live on a
total area of 41,000 km
2. The country consists of 26
cantons, which differ thoroughly in terms of area, num-
ber of inhabitants, population density, socio-economic
situation, and language (see Figure 1).
1) See acronyms, full cantonal names, and more can-
tonal characteristics in Appendix, Table 4.
The responsibility of government is divided into three
state levels: the central government (i.e., ‘confederation’),
the 26 cantons, and approximately 2,600 municipalities.
The three levels also intervene in the Swiss health care
system, which is normally characterized as a ‘system of
regulated competition’ [1]. Briefly said, ‘regulated com-
petition’ implies competition between health care mar-
ket players wherever competition seems to generate
better outcomes than regulation by state authorities.
Some important characteristics of health care market
players are described in Table 1. In particular, the out-
patient health service providers in Switzerland operate
mainly on a private basis, while private- and public-
owned institutions are responsible for the provision of
inpatient services.
Although the regulatory responsibilities and public
funding of Swiss health care are shared by three state
levels, the 26 cantons are mostly responsible for the
implementation of health policy. This includes the
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outpatient services for their populations and to contri-
bute the largest part of the state payments.
The confederation, on the other hand, has more legisla-
tive functions in the area of MHI and supervising func-
tions for the MHI insurance market. It is responsible for
Figure 1 Population size and main language of the 26 Swiss cantons
1, 2009.
Table 1 Swiss ‘market’ for mandatory health insurance (MHI), 2007
Main actors/
components
Number
of actors
Number
of beds
Owner-
ship
MHI costs
(billion CHF)
General remarks
MHI companies 87 - private - MHI companies authorized by the confederation and obliged to
contract with service providers (’contract obligation’)
General practitioners in
private practices (GP)
5,915 - private 2.0 (10.6%) Calculated full-time employees for general practitioners, pediatrics and
gynecologists in private practices (MHI services)
Specialist doctors in
private practices
3,244 - private 1.9 (10.2%) Calculated full-time employees for specialized physicians in private
practices (MHI services)
Hospitals inpatient 321 41,910 public &
private
4.8 (26.3%) General hospitals and specialized clinics for psychiatry and rehabilitation
(MHI services)
Hospitals outpatient > 130 - public &
private
2.8 (14.9%) General hospitals (130) normally supply outpatient care; but this is not
known for all the specialized clinics (181)
Drugs 1,700/
~4,000
- private 3.6 (19.5%) Number of pharmacies: 1,700; number of self dispensing physicians:
~4,000 (MHI services)
Long-term care homes 1,509 87,960 public &
private
1.6 (8.7%) Nursing homes (without homes for disabled, for addicts and persons
with psychosocial problems, MHI services)
Total of MHI services
delivered
- - - 18.5 (100%) Other providers account for the rest of CHF 1.8 billion (9.8%); MHI
administration costs and cost participations are not included here
Sources: [2-5], own calculations.
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definition of the package of services covered by the MHI.
Other federal responsibilities include the setting of stan-
dards of education and training of the health care person-
nel, populations’ health protection, surveillance and
management of transferable diseases, and health sciences
and research.
Finally, the municipalities see their most important
role in carrying out the tasks handed over to them by
the cantons. In most cases, these tasks involve the
operation and funding of providers either in outpatient
or inpatient long-term care (i.e., care at home and nur-
sing homes).
The two important characteristics of the Swiss health
care system mentioned above, regulated competition and
federalist structure, are intensively discussed in Swiss
health politics. In spite of clear advantages such as effi-
ciency gains and proximity to the local populations and
their needs, there are also major obstacles to overcome.
Therefore, the system has an enormous complexity, and
good governance in Swiss health care seems difficult [6].
Certain amounts of incoherence, twin-track processes,
and obstructions in health care regulation beyond the
national or cantonal level have to be accepted.
Empirically, it is not consistently proven yet whether,
all in all, such a system leads to higher - or lower -
health care costs than in other comparable countries [7].
However, it is clear that regulated competition and
strong federalism result in large disparities in health
care utilization and costs across geographical areas (see
Appendix, Table 4).
Important work to identify reasons for growing and
disparate health care expenditures - and utilization - in
western countries started about 50 years ago [8]. In this
research, tax-financed health care systems provide ‘free’
health care services to their users, and therefore higher
shares of public financing lead to higher spending on
health in such societies. In the ‘model of unbalanced
growth’ [9], the nominal wages in the health care sector
must be increased, even without progress in productiv-
ity. This causes more spending on health care as the
economy grows. In later studies [10,11], combinations of
higher national income and greater share of public
financing were suspected to have driving effects on both
the demand and the supply of health care.
Many more models that can potentially determine the
influence factors on health care costs and utilization
have been developed and tested [12,13]. As mentioned
earlier by internationally-recognized researchers
[12,14,15], there is still no widely accepted theoretical
base to explain international or regional disparities in
level and growth of health care spending [7]. This is due
to the great complexity and heterogeneity of the organi-
zation and the financing of health care systems, the
multiplicity of actors involved, and the specific nature of
‘health’ as an economic good [16].
The available literature of interest continues to focus
on finding factors to explain international or intra-
national disparities in levels and growth of health care
costs and related components. One actual literature
review about the subject [7] finds rising incomes, ageing
population (i.e., proximity to death), technological pro-
gress, and territorial decentralization as the main health
care cost drivers in western economies.
A Swiss study on the subject explains the regional dis-
parities in level and growth of health care costs across
the country by applying cross-sectional regressions [17].
This study identifies significant correlations between
higher health care costs and stronger social disintegra-
tion, more unemployment, higher concentration of phy-
sicians, more specialized clinics, and a Latin-speaking
(i.e., French- and Italian-speaking; see Figure 1) popula-
tion. Later studies using panel econometric approaches
[18,19] find significant influences due to higher income
levels, older populations, higher mortality rates, denser
populations, and a time trend.
As ‘new’ significant factors in another Swiss study using
cross-sectional regressions [20], higher numbers of women
in the population and more pharmacies per capita are
detected. In a more recent study [21] applying exactly the
same methods but with more recent data [18], a greater
number of small children in the population and higher
prices for MHI services are identified as significant expla-
natory factors for cantonal cost differences. Also using
econometric panel models, the most recent study con-
sulted [22] indicates significant cost driving effects of a
higher number of drug-dispensing physicians and more
foreigners in the population, while more managed care
models tend to contain health costs.
Most of these studies that compare health expendi-
tures on the international level try to work with the lar-
gest possible aggregates of costs [7,12]. This seems
reasonable because it is the best way to overcome the
problem of enormous differences in the structure of the
provision and the financing of health care services in
different (western) countries.
Furthermore, some studies on regional variations in
health care costs in Switzerland [17,18,21,22] put much
effort into creating the broadest possible cost aggregates.
Other studies [19,20,23] argue that higher aggregated cost
units tend to create more reversal influences. The higher
aggregates often compensate each other, and therefore the
existing disparities are more likely to ‘disappear’ statisti-
cally. The conclusion drawn from this fact for this work is
that the factors responsible for cost differences should be
scrutinized at the highest level of detail.
The research interest in this paper follows the cited
literature: it aims to empirically consolidate the most
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the supply side, the demand side, the financing side, and
the political-cultural side of the Swiss health care system
[18,23]. On the supply side, it is the link between supply
and utilization of health care services [24-26] that can
be examined in particular. As most MHI services in
Switzerland are remunerated in a fee-for-service system
in the observed time period and most of the service pro-
viders have clear incentives to bring their income to
their targeted level [26-28], it is reasonable to suppose
that higher densities of general practitioners (GP), spe-
cialists, hospital beds, and hospital outpatient care sup-
ply lead to higher consumption levels in the four
corresponding service groups as well as in outpatient
medication.
On the demand side, it will be tested whether higher
proportions of older people with greater morbidity and
mortality [29], larger population densities indicating
urban regions with fewer social barriers to seeing health
professionals rather quickly [30], and higher unemploy-
ment associated with poorer health status [31] indeed
cause driving effects in the use of MHI health services. In
addition, it is also analyzed whether higher average
income - normally related with better health status, bet-
ter health behavior, and more supplemental (private)
health insurance [21] - is associated with a decrease in
the utilization of MHI health services.
Concerning financing of health care, this paper
attempts to prove empirically whether high deductibles -
the standard deductible in MHI is Swiss francs (CHF)
300 by default, but it can be raised to CHF 2,500 in favor
of a limited premium reduction and health commodities
consumed within one year, and up to these amounts
have to be paid out of pocket by policy holders - and
alternative health insurance plans - containing institu-
tional requirements and financial incentives such as gate
keeping, limited access to providers, and capitation
schemes - favor the utilization of GP [28,29] and outpati-
ent services, a cost-conscious consumption of drugs [32],
and a reduction of the use of specialists, outpatient hospi-
tals, inpatient hospitals, and nursing homes.
With regard to political-cultural variables, the Latin-
speaking part of Switzerland is often said to gravitate
toward an increased utilization of services of specialists,
inpatient and outpatient hospitals, and higher drug con-
sumption, but with less frequent use of GP and nursing
home services [17,18,21]. Thus, it is empirically tested
whether such cultural differences could be responsible for
this deviating consumption behavior.
Methods
Data
T h em a i nd a t as o u r c ef o rt h es i xd e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e s
(see Appendix, Table 5) is ‘Datenpool santésuisse’ (DPS)
of the Swiss Association of Health Insurers [33]. DPS
has been in existence since 1997, but the complete sets
of quantity (and cost) indicators of MHI services used
here are only recorded every year starting in 2000. DPS
allows for the relating of MHI costs for age and gender
groups of the resident (cantonal) population and the
v a r i o u sg r o u p so fs e r v i c e s( w h i c hc a nb el o c a t e di nt h e
same or another canton). DPS is not available to the
general public. But on request, the Swiss Association of
Health Insurers can put the data at researchers’ disposal.
In addition to the costs, DPS also details the quantities
of services delivered: the number of consultations and
home visits (i.e., ‘basic services’) of GP and specialists, the
number of consultations in outpatient hospitals, the
number of hospital days, and the number of days of stay
in nursing homes and cost volumes for drugs. Quantities
- and cost volumes for drugs - are calculated per capita
(i.e., per head of the cantonal population). To get these
numbers, the average resident population according to
population statistics (ESPOP) [34] of the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office (FSO) is used.
DPS and ESPOP statistics are also used to calculate sev-
eral of the independent variables (see Appendix, Table 5):
the densities of GP (GRU) and specialists (SPZ), the per-
centage of outpatient hospital MHI costs compared to the
total outpatient MHI costs (PAM), the proportion of peo-
ple with deductibles higher than CHF 300 compared to
the total number of insured people in the MHI (FRA), the
share of alternative MHI plans compared to the total
number of MHI insurance contracts (MOD), and the pro-
portion of the population over 65 years of age compared
to the total population (ALT65). Additionally, the share of
the population over 85 years of age (ALT85) is calculated
to explain nursing home utilization [19].
ESPOP is also employed as an ‘auxiliary variable’ with
three other independent variables: the FSO data sources
‘Medical Statistics of Hospitals’ (MSH) [3] to calculate the
density of hospital beds (BED), ‘Areal Statistics’ [35] to cal-
culate the population density per canton (POP), and ‘Sta-
tistics of Registered Unemployment’ [36] of the State
Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) to calculate the
cantonal unemployment rates (ALQ). The cantonal
incomes per capita (VEL) come from the ‘Statistics on
National Accounts’ [37]. Finally, the proportion of the
Latin-speaking resident population as a percentage of the
resident population with ‘major language non-German’
(LAT) from the federal population census 2000 [38] is
calculated.
Data analysis
As explained in the background section, an approach of
‘disaggregated identification of influence factors’ is
emphasized in this work. Therefore, individual analyses
on the cost ‘sub-component quantity’ of the ‘subgroups
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tors, hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, medication
and nursing homes) are carried out.
’Quantity’ delineates the number of consultations and
home visits (basic services) per capita and year of GP
(AZG) and specialists (AZS), the number of consulta-
tions per capita and year in outpatient hospitals (AMB),
the number of days per capita and year in hospital
(HOS), and the length of stay in days per capita and
year in nursing homes (SOM). Since there is no quantity
indicator available for consumed drugs, cost volumes
per capita and year (MED) are used.
As suggested by the literature, supply-side, demand-
side, financing, and political-cultural variables create the
influencing factors (independent variables) of the models.
Thus, indicators for the four most important suppliers of
health care are used (see Table 1). These include the
‘density of GP’ (GRU), the ‘density of specialists’ (SPZ),
the ‘density of hospital beds’ (BED), and ‘higher propor-
tions of outpatient hospital care’ (AMB). The four most
cited indicators on the demand side in the literature,
more old people (ALT65), higher average incomes (VEL),
larger population densities (POP), and social deprivation
- operationalized as higher rates of unemployment (ALQ)
in the canton - are kept.
From the two available financing variables, both the
share of low deductibles (FRA) and the share of alternative
health insurance plans (MOD) are retained in the models,
as well as the share of Latin-speaking population (LAT) as
political-cultural variable. Finally, a trend variable (TRD)
that records medical-technical progress and general ten-
dencies for every group of services that are not yet con-
tained in the other explaining factors is added.
With the goal of a simultaneous explanation of the
regional variations in level and evolution of MHI ser-
vices, panel econometric regressions that combine longi-
tudinal and cross-sectional observations are chosen. The
indices ‘i’ for 26 cantons and ‘t’ for eight years give
expression to this combination in Formula (1).
Yit = f(GRUit,S P Z it,B E D it,P A M it, ALT65/85it,
POPit,A L Q it,V E L it,F R A it,M O D it,L A T i,T R D t)
(1)
where: Yit =A Z G it or AZSit or HOSit or AMBit or
MEDit or SOMit;
and: i = 1,2, ..., 26; t = 2000, 2001, ..., 2007.
The statistical examination of the six dependent vari-
ables Yit shows that they are all in continuous form, nor-
mally distributed, and do not contain any outliers, so the
use of a parametric linear model is appropriate [39].
Pooled-regression models (PRM) for panel data, fixed-
effects models (FEM), and random-effects models (REM)
can be applied for this purpose. However, compared to
FEM and REM, the results of PRM are not efficient.
The Hausman test is used to check whether - given
the existence of unbiased estimators - not only FEM but
also REM are consistent. FEM have the limitation that
they can only take into account the variation within the
groups of observed individuals. FEM estimate individual
cantonal parameters in addition to those of the explana-
tory variables. Therefore, with limited observations, and
to retain as much explanatory power as possible, it
makes sense to estimate FEM by a within transform of
the model (i.e., mean-differencing every variable with
respect to its cantonal mean). With the corresponding
‘FEM-within-routine’ [39], all coefficients are estimated.
REM make use of variances both within groups and
between groups of observations. More information is
used in this case, and so REM are generally more efficient
than FEM. To concretely estimate such (consistent)
REM, routines according to the generalized least squares
procedure are applied. Finally, four FEM (for AZG, AZS,
A M Ba n dM E D )a n dt w oR E M( f o rH O Sa n dS O M )a r e
calculated. Moreover, F-tests (in FEM) and Wald tests (in
REM) are applied to verify individual and joint linearity
of the estimated parameters. All calculations and tests
were performed with STATA11
® software.
Results
Participating in DPS is optional for Swiss health insur-
ance companies, and so its coverage in 2007 (2000)
applies to 98% (92%) of all insured people. To estimate
complete values, the data are extrapolated using the sta-
tistics of the ‘Common Institution under the Federal
Health Insurance Act’ [40]. The ‘Common Institution’
runs the risk adjustment system in the MHI, so its
highly-aggregated indicators cover all insured persons
( i . e . ,t h ee n t i r eS w i s sp o p u l a t i o n ) .T h ee x t r a p o l a t i o n
assumes that the missing 2% (8%) of persons in DPS
have the same cost structure as the 98% (92%) of
insured people who are included in DPS in 2007 (2000).
All calculations presented hereafter are based on the
extrapolated values of DPS.
Table 2 contains different indicators to describe the
cantonal disparities in level and growth of the six
dependent variables, which cover more than 90% of
MHI health services (see Table 1). The average number
of basic services of GP per capita and year (AZG)
between 2000 and 2007 is 3.7, and it varies between 2.3
contacts (canton Geneva GE and Jura JU) and 4.7 con-
tacts (Glarus GL); this corresponds to an EQ-ratio of
around 1.6. The same indicators for specialists (AZS)
are 1.2 (mean) and show fluctuations between 0.7 con-
tacts (Nidwalden NW, Obwalden OW and Uri UR) and
2.1 contacts in Basel-Stadt BS; the EQ for specialist ser-
vices is greater here at 3.2, indicating larger disparities
between cantons than for GP.
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per 1,000 persons. The cantonal variation ranges from
1.3 days (Nidwalden NW, Obwalden OW and Zug ZG)
to 3.5 days (Basel-Stadt BS), which results in an EQ-
ratio of 2.7. The consultations in outpatient hospitals
(AMB) are at 0.9 per person per year. They fluctuate
between 0.6 days (Schwyz SZ) and 2.7 days (Basel-Stadt
BS), and the ratio between these two extreme values is
actually 4.5. This is the largest inter-cantonal variation
across the six dependent variables.
The average annual costs per person for outpatient
medication (MED) are at CHF 420 and range from CHF
287 (Appenzell Innerrhoden AI) to CHF 572 (Basel-Stadt
BS), with an EQ-ratio of 2.0. Finally, there is an average
of 3.4 nursing home days per capita and year (SOM)
remunerated in the MHI; this number varies between 2.2
(Valais VS) and 5.9 (Appenzell Ausserhoden AR). Here,
the result is an EQ-ratio of 2.6.
The last indicator in Table 2 describes the general
cantonal trends in the six variables during the observed
period of eight years (Δ% 2000-2007). The tendencies
for the utilization of basic services of GP per capita
(AZG; -0.2% for the whole country) between 2000 and
2007 are non-uniform: one half of the cantons show ris-
ing trends, and the other half show decreasing trends
for this indicator. The result is also geographically non-
uniform for the utilization of specialists (AZS; -0.9%),
b u tp a r t i c u l a r l yl a r g ec a n t o n s( s e eF i g u r e1 )s h o w
decreasing trends. For the number of hospital days per
capita and year (HOS; -0.5%), some more cantons with
decreasing trends can be found as well.
The other three dependent variables, the consultations
in outpatient hospitals (AMB; +7.1%), the costs for outpa-
tient medication (MED; +3.2%), and the number of nur-
sing home days (SOM; +6.6%), show expanding
tendencies across all cantons. There is only one exception
from this general trend: in canton Basel-Stadt (BS), the
number of consultations in outpatient hospitals per capita
and year (AMB) declined from 3.1 in 2000 to 2.5 in 2007
(-3.0% annually).
Table 3 shows the results of the multivariate estimates
for the six explanatory models. As mentioned above,
four fixed-effects models for the dependent variables
AZG, AZS, AMB, MED (i.e., outpatient services) and
two random-effects models for the dependent variables
HOS and SOM (i.e., inpatient services) are calculated.
The cantonal and time-related variations of the utiliza-
tion of GP services per capita (AZG) are significant and
positively linked with higher densities of general practi-
tioners (GRU) and specialists (SPZ), a larger share of
outpatient hospital services (PAM), a greater population
density (POP), a higher average cantonal income (VEL),
and a larger share of high deductibles (FRA). However,
there is a negative relationship between GP utilization
and a greater hospital bed density (BED), a higher
unemployment rate (ALQ), and more alternative MHI
insurance plans (MOD).
The utilization of specialist services per capita (AZS)
is linked with a higher density of specialists (SPZ), a
higher population density (POP), and a larger share of
high deductibles (FRA). Otherwise, lower unemployment
rates (ALQ) and the trend variable (TRD) accompany
reduced utilization of specialists.
The number of (inpatient) hospital days per head of
population (HOS) shows to be ‘driven’ by an older
population (ALT65), a higher population density (POP),
and higher unemployment (ALQ). The trend variable
(TRD) expresses the general downward trend in the per
capita utilization of inpatient hospitals.
For differences in the quantities of outpatient hospitals
utilization (AMB), the estimates show driving effects of a
larger share of outpatient hospital services (PAM), an
older population (ALT65), and a larger share of high
deductibles (FRA). Slowing effects come from a greater
supply of GP (GRU) and a higher unemployment rate
(ALQ), while all other factors prove to be insignificant.
The variation in drug costs per head of population
(MED) is highly significant and positively associated with a
higher density of GP (GRU) and specialists (SPZ), the can-
tonal unemployment rate (ALQ), and the trend variable
Table 2 Dependent variables: levels
1) and trends
2), 2000-2007
MHI service groups: per capita utilization n (CAN-TON
3)) T (YEAR) N (OBS) MEAN
4) STD
4) MIN
4) MAX
4) EQ
4) Δ% 2000-2007
2)
General practitioners: basic services (AZG) 26 8 208 3.7 0.5 2.9 4.7 1.6 -0.2%
Specialist doctors: basic services (AZS) 26 8 208 1.2 0.3 0.7 2.1 3.2 -0.9%
Hospital inpatient: hospital days (HOS) 26 8 208 1.9 0.5 1.3 3.5 2.7 -0.5%
Hospital outpatient: consultations (AMB) 26 8 208 0.9 0.5 0.6 2.7 4.5 7.1%
Drugs outpatient:costs (MED) 26 8 208 420 89 287 572 2.0 3.2%
Nursing homes:days of stay (SOM) 26 8 208 3.4 1.0 2.2 5.9 2.6 6.6%
Source: [33], own calculations.
1) Average absolute numbers of per capita services, days and costs between 2000 and 2007.
2) Average annual growth rates in % of per capita services, days and costs between 2000 and 2007 (Δ% 2000-2007).
3) See Figure 1 and full names and more characteristics of cantons in Appendix, Table 4.
4) MEAN = arithmetical mean; STD = standard deviation; MIN = minimal value; MAX = maximal value; EQ = extremal quotient.
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Estimation technique FEM FEM REM FEM FEM REM
General. practi-tioners basic
services AZG
Specialist doctors basic
services AZS
Hospital inpatient
hospital days HOS
Hospital outpatient
consul-tations AMB
Drugs outpatient
costs MED
Nursing homes days
of stay SOM
Density of general
practitioners GRU
0.042*** (0.0036) 0.002 (0.0022) -0.0003 (0.0036) -0.017*** (0.0046) 1.379*** (0.4920) 0.020** (0.0081)
Density of specialist
doctors SPZ
0.013*** (0.0038) 0.020*** (0.0024) 0.001 (0.0038) -0.004 (0.0049) 1.322** (0.5218) -0.026*** (0.0086)
Density of hospital beds
BED
-0.0001*** (0.0002) -0.00007 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002) -0.00001 (0.0002) 0.022 (0.0257) 0.001** (0.0004)
Share of hospital
outpatient costs PAM
0.012** (0.0057) 0.004 (0.0036) -0.0001 (0.0081) 0.059*** (0.0074) -0.935 (0.7881) -0.060*** (0.0159)
Population 65+/85+
ALT65/ALT85
1)
0.004 (0.0033) 0.002 (0.0021) 0.011*** (0.0026) 0.020*** (0.0043) -0.644 (0.4610) 0.175***
1) (0.0218)
Population density POP 0.259*** (0.0772) 0.116** (0.0486) 0.013** (0.0061) 0.209 (0.1164) -22.629** (10.6982) -0.025 (0.0159)
Unemployment rate ALQ -0.019*** (0.0031) -0.015*** (0.0020) 0.014*** (0.0040) -0.023*** (0.0047) 1.348*** (0.4308) 0.020** (0.0083)
Average cantonal income
VEL
0.390*** (0.1416) 0.083 (0.089) 0.128 (0.1440) -0.031 (0.1847) 14.903 (19.6131) 0.716** (0.3266)
Share of higher
deductibles FRA
0.001*** (0.0004) 0.001*** (0.0002) -0.00004 (0.0004) 0.001** (0.0005) -0.132*** (0.0487) 0.003*** (0.0009)
Alternative MHI-plans
MOD
-0.001** (0.0004) 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0005) -0.001 (0.0005) -0.213*** (0.0511) 0.0000 (0.0001)
Share of Latin-speaking
pop. LAT
omitted omitted 0.0001 (0.0002) omitted omitted -0.002*** (0.0004)
Trend variable TRD -0.016 (0.0105) -0.021*** (0.0066) -0.047*** (0.0124) 0.022 (0.0137) 15.121*** (1.4550) 0.153*** (0.0255)
Source: own calculations.
Standard error in parenthesis. *** = significant at 0.01%, ** = significant at 0.05%; omitted = FEM can only estimate coefficients for variables that vary over time.
1) To estimate the utilization of nursing homes, the population 85 years and older is used.
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2(TRD). A greater population density (POP), a larger share
of high deductibles (FRA), and a larger proportion of alter-
native MHI plans (MOD) are significant and negatively
related with drug costs per capita (MED).
Finally, the following factors are shown to have signifi-
cant positive effects on the per capita differences in
nursing home utilization (SOM): a higher density of GP
(GRU) and of hospital beds (BED), a larger share of popu-
lation older than 85 years (ALT85), a higher unemploy-
ment rate (ALQ), a higher average cantonal income (VEL),
a larger share of high deductibles (FRA), and the general
trend (TRD). On the other hand, slowing effects on utiliza-
tion of nursing homes per capita (SOM) seem to result
from a higher (potential) supply of specialists (SPZ), a
greater share of hospital outpatient services (PAM), and a
mainly Latin-speaking environment and pattern of use
(LAT).
Discussion
The results’ section described how the interplay of the
independent variables influences the utilization of every
individual group of MHI services. Due to having used
exactly the same set of independent variables for all six
models, the perspective can now be changed: the influ-
ence of every independent variable on the six groups of
MHI services can be discussed simultaneously by com-
paring them across these groups.
Higher densities of general practitioners (GRU) tend to
reinforce the per capita use of their services, the use of
drugs, and the number of days per capita in nursing
homes, the lattermost relation expressing the intense col-
laboration of GP with nursing homes in Switzerland. A
higher potential supply of specialists (SPZ) also drives -
beside the use of their own services - the utilization of
GP services and the consumption of drugs. More hospital
beds (BED) seem to reinforce - more than the utilization
of their own services - the use of nursing homes, an
expression of the close collaboration of these two groups
of inpatient health service providers. Finally, a higher
share of hospital outpatient services on total outpatient
services (PAM) goes hand in hand with more intense per
capita utilization of such services, including GP services.
All four supply-side variables each show one significant
slowing influence factor. More GP (GRU) tend to slow
down the utilization of - relatively expensive - outpatient
hospitals. This could be an important finding in terms of
stabilizing health care costs. More specialists (SPZ) and a
higher share of hospital outpatient services (PAM) curtail
the utilization of nursing homes. These results are posi-
tive in the sense that a growing number of older people
in Switzerland are trying to avoid institutionalization in
homes as long as possible. In an isolated consideration of
MHI costs only, this behavior of older people tends to
have rather cost driving effects: most of the costs of
specialist and outpatient hospital services are paid by
MHI, whereas a large part of nursing home financing
comes from outside the MHI - primarily out-of-pocket
payments. More hospital beds (BED) mean less frequent
utilization of GP. The function of GP warranting health
s e r v i c es u p p l yi nr e m o t ea r e a so ft h ec o u n t r y-w i t h o u t
hospitals - could explain this negative association.
Caution is warranted in directly concluding supplier
inducement from the association between higher popula-
tion-physician or population-hospital beds ratios and
more extensive utilization of medical services [24-26,28].
This relationship could also reflect an effect of lower
prices on patient demand, a supply response to variation
in health status, or improved availability. Conversely, in
health care systems, where service providers are mainly
remunerated by fee-for-service schemes and have clear
incentives to bring their income to a targeted level, the
existence of over-supply and supplier inducement is
probable.
Moreover, these presented effects of the supply-side fac-
tors might also be an expression of two different types of
cantonal health delivery schemes, as they were described
in a former Swiss study using qualitative approaches [41].
On one hand, they may show a ‘center-type scheme’,i n
which high - inpatient and outpatient - hospital and spe-
cialist density and use accompany intensive supply and
utilization of hospital and specialist services. On the other
hand, they may reflect the ‘peripheral-type scheme’ of a
cantonal health system, which is more focused on primary
care and nursing homes, while supply and utilization of
specialists and hospital services are restrained.
Driving effects on the use of health care providers for
all four tested factors on the demand side are found.
Higher age (ALT65/ALT85) is responsible for higher
utilization of inpatient and outpatient hospitals and nur-
sing homes. This result makes sense in the nursing
home branch, but the discussion of the relationship
between high age and hospital utilization could be
enlarged by arguments coming from literature about
‘proximity to death’ [42]. Higher population densities
(POP) have driving effects on the utilization of both
types of physicians and on inpatient hospitals creating
fewer social barriers in urban areas to seeing a health
professional quickly. High unemployment (ALQ) has
driving effects on the consumption of drugs and on
more frequent/longer stays in hospitals and nursing
homes. Finally, a higher average cantonal income (VEL)
is significantly correlated with higher levels of utilization
of per capita GP services and nursing homes. This is
also the case for specialists, hospital inpatient services,
and drug costs, although these interrelations are not sta-
tistically significant.
Among these demand-side variables, the unemploy-
ment rate (ALQ) shows significant slowing effects with
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specialists, and hospitals. The financial difficulties of
unemployed persons could explain this finding and mer-
its special attention. It could suggest that unemployed
people avoid outpatient treatments and compensate this
with greater drug consumption and more/longer una-
voidable stays in hospitals or nursing homes. An under-
supply of such groups of vu l n e r a b l ep e o p l ei nt h e
outpatient sector [43] can have serious medical, social,
and financial consequences.
The negative association between population density
(POP) and outpatient medication costs per capita was
unexpected. An explanation could be that a higher num-
ber of hospital activities in urban areas partially substi-
tute provision of drugs delivered by pharmacies and
physicians - contained in the indicator, MED. It could
also indicate that people in urban areas show a tendency
to pay more out of pocket for drugs, particularly in com-
bination with more high deductibles.
Regarding the two indicators of health services finan-
cing, one would expect slowing effects from higher deduc-
tibles (FRA) and more alternative MHI plans (MOD) on
all groups of health services, except on GP with their coor-
dination functions in alternative MHI plans [44]. However,
the results in Table 3 show that more deductibles actually
go along with more intense utilization of GP, specialists,
hospital outpatient services, and nursing homes. One
explanation for this result could be the skewed distribution
of health care costs: 30% of all insured people cause
approximately 80% of total MHI costs in Switzerland [45].
As a result, the potential to reduce unnecessary use of
health care services by financial incentives like higher
deductibles remains limited [46]. Exceptions are outpatient
drugs where more deductibles and more alternative health
insurance plans seem to be able to lower the medication
costs per capita (MED). Moreover, the negative association
between more alternative health insurance plans and GP
utilization does not confirm the assumption of higher utili-
zation because of the coordination function of GP in such
plans. This could connect with the limitation of the model
that only frequencies of contacts are measured in the
models. Better coordination by GP does not necessarily
mean more frequent use of the services of this group of
providers.
The ‘political-cultural’ variable, the share of Latin-speak-
ing people (LAT), reveals only one significant effect in the
estimation models, namely a reduced utilization of nursing
homes. The data used here cannot explain whether this is
due to epidemiological reasons, substitution of long-term
care with more informal care at home, or more profes-
sional outpatient (or even hospital) long-term care [47].
The trend variables (TRD) can explain additional var-
iance of the dependent variables in the six models. The
accelerations observed for drugs, nursing homes, and
hospital outpatient services (not significant) are consistent
with general expectations (see Table 2). The same is true
for the declining trends of inpatient hospital utilization
and per capita use of specialists and GP (not significant).
Whereas declining trends for GP and inpatient hospitals
are broadly expected in Switzerland [19], most people
would not expect such a reduction for specialist doctors
who have constantly rising costs, but this finding can be
further explained with a limitation in the dependent ‘quan-
tity’ variables. As one can only count the number of con-
sultations in the outpatient sector and the number of days
in the inpatient sector, changes in medical practices [48]
that occur across cantons and over time cannot be seen.
Thus, for specialist doctors in Switzerland there exists a
trend toward fewer consultations per capita during the
observed time period (see Table 2).
Conclusions
The findings of this paper confirm that consumption
and cost-containment strategies in health care should
integrate several supply-side, demand-side, and financing
elements [23]. First, the cantonal structure of the health
care supply system turns out to be a crucial element.
High densities of health care suppliers result - at least in
their combination with fee-for-service remuneration,
target incomes, and contracting obligation for insurers -
in more intense utilization per capita of most groups of
health care services and in greater drug consumption
[28]. Whether or not this happens through supplier-
induced demand, health policy authorities should be
made aware of this fact.
Among these supply-side elements, special attention
should be paid to the growing amounts of relatively
expensive hospital outpatient services [49]. The results in
the models show that higher densities of GP could have
relieving effects on hospital outpatient use, and so a geo-
graphically well-distributed supply of primary care services
is important. Moreover, it seems that a greater supply of
specialized and relatively costly outpatient health care ser-
vices reduces the intensity of nursing home utilization
[50]. Health politicians should be aware that what is bene-
ficial for older patients - who normally try to avoid institu-
tionalization with its relatively large out-of-pocket and
relatively small MHI funding in Switzerland as long as
possible - can have rather cost driving effects on the MHI
as a whole.
Further, the extent of driving factors for health care ser-
vices and costs on the demand side - population ageing,
urbanization, and social deprivation of certain groups
appearing together with raising average incomes (i.e.,
more economic inequalities) - contributes to regional dis-
parities in consumption and costs of health care services.
Strategies to counter such driving factors could be family-
friendly tax policies or investments in incentives favoring
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other political and social areas would benefit from this
active strategy against problems of ‘modern and globalized
societies’, such as social isolation, poverty, unemployment,
or educational and language deficits. In addition to the
driving effects of such societal phenomena, it is particu-
larly important to remind the political authorities about
the danger of possible under-utilization of outpatient
health care services [43] by vulnerable groups like unem-
ployed persons.
As only a few financing elements with potential effects
on consumption and costs of health care services were
modeled, the findings here are rather limited. Interest-
ingly, however, higher deductibles accompany more
intense per capita utilization of GP, specialists, hospital
outpatient services, and nursing homes. It would be
fruitful to investigate this finding in more detail, but to
do so it would be necessary to work with data sets on
the level of individuals (i.e., insured persons or patients).
It seems quite plausible that one would find out that
people with higher deductibles are not actually consum-
ing more MHI services. It would be more likely that in
cantons with high MHI costs - caused largely by the
‘few’ sick persons with normal CHF 300 deductibles -
more ‘healthy’ people choose high deductibles in order
to reduce their premium burden. That is one important
reason why high (or low) consumption of MHI services
and higher (or lower) deductibles co-exist in Switzer-
land. Moreover, the overall effects of higher deductibles
on MHI services consumption should be confronted
with their negative solidarity effect on chronically ill
people.
The new and strong points in this work are as follows:
disparities in health care utilization in space and time
are investigated on a rather detailed level - quantity
indicators for six individual service groups within MHI.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ev a r i a t i on in these detailed vari-
ables is tested with a set of influence factors that repre-
sent complete explanatory models containing supply-
side, demand-side, financing-side and political-cultural
variables. The models capture much variation of the
dependent variables with a good overall significance in
the selected explanation factors. The testing of a con-
stant set of 12 explanation variables across the six mod-
els allows a double-way interpretation of the results: in
addition to understanding how each of the six depen-
dent variables is influenced by a set of independent vari-
ables, one can learn more about how each individual
influence factor drives up or slows down all six health
service groups.
What was just called a ‘strong point’ is simultaneously
the main limitation of the study: working with quantity
indicators for individual service groups within the MHI
means being still on a too highly-aggregated level of
modeling. When counting and explaining the number of
consultations in the outpatient sector and the number
of days in the inpatient sector, the changes in medical
practice are not taken into account. A closer look at
more detailed groups of health service providers, like
different types of hospitals or different types of outpati-
ent specialists, would have been possible, but DPS con-
tains information only on those people who actually
sent their bills to their health insurance provider. Thus,
bills that were not sent for reasons such as a high
deductible are not included in DPS. The actual amount
of such ‘hidden’ MHI services and costs and their poten-
tial to bias the generated results are not known.
It is important to note that the missing quantity indi-
cator for consumed drugs (MED) is a minor problem.
As prices for MHI-remunerated drugs are determined
by federal authorities on the national level, disparities in
drug cost volumes can be caused only by differences in
consumed quantities or a varying medical use of medi-
cines [51].
In respect to the spatial dimension, analyses of varia-
tions on the most detailed regional level - these could
be districts or even municipalities in Switzerland -
would be productive. However, as mentioned in the
other studies, the lack of disposable data does not allow
for going below the cantonal level.
All attempts to overcome these limitations would
remain limited as long as it is impossible to use indivi-
dual patient data. Primarily for data protection reasons,
DPS only groups patients by age, gender, and canton.
While all the averages of these groups used throughout
the work are normal distributed, it is well known that
the individual observations are not. To underline this
problem, the finding of the study that estimates that
30% of all insured people cause around 80% of total
MHI costs in Switzerland [45] can be repeated. As long
as such individual data sources on health care service
utilization are unavailable in Switzerland, the possibili-
ties of further validating the findings of this work
remain limited.
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